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COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON LABOR INJUNCTIONS ISSUED
IN DISREGARD OF ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTES
THE TREND of recent appellate decisions has dispelled much of the doubt
which beclouded the status of Norris-LaGuardia type statutes.' At long
last, misgivings of unconstitutionality seem definitely to have been dissipated.2
Even more important, the definition of a "labor dispute" has gradually been
given the broad meaning originally contemplated by the authors of the legis-
1. See Comments (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 1295; (1938) 6 I. J. A. Buua. 111;
(1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 1320; (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1064.
2. Sem v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U, S. 468 (1937), (1937) 46 YALE
L. J. 1064, (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1227; Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 58 S. Ct. 578 (U. S.
1938), (1938) 6 I. J. A. BULL. 111; United Elec. Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) I (C. C. A.
7th, 1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714 (1936), (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1320; Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) cert. denied, 293 U. S.
595 (1934).
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lation.3 Unfortunately, however, the protective features of anti-injunction
legislation may still be vitiated by hostile lower court judges. Despite the
admonition of appellate courts, these judges may, by the device of calling
an obvious labor dispute not a "labor dispute,"4 still endow their improperly-
issued restraining orders and temporary injunctions with the same decisive
effect upon the particular industrial conflict that motivated the enactment
of this type of legislation. 5 The problem of salvaging the most from such
judicial sabotage becomes essentially one of providing a speedy method of
reviewing such orders and injunctions. The purpose of this comment is to
explore the possible techniques for accomplishing this result.
It has long been recognized that the ordinary processes of appeal leave
labor with at most a pyrrhic legal victory.6 To remedy this deficiency, anti-
injunction statutes have made special provision for a "speedy appeal." But
the typical statutory language apparently restricts this procedure to review
of the propriety of an injunction in a case involving an admitted "labor
dispute," not the question of whether a "labor dispute" exists.1 "If, therefore,
3. Lauf v. Shiner & Co., 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., Inc., 58 S. Ct. 703 (U. S., 1938); Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
& Beverage Dispensers, Local Union No. 183, 159 So. 637 (La. App., 1935) ; American
Furn. Co. v. Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 222 Wis. 338, 263 N. IV. 250 (1936), (1936)
85 U. OF PA. L. Rmv. 224.
4. The statutory definition is broad and all-inclusive:
"(c) . . . 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S. C. § 113 (1934). However, this device
of hostile judges is notorious. See Comment (1937) 50 HAnv. L RE7. 1295.
5. See FRANKYuRB T & GmmnzNT, THE LA.oR INJUNCTIOz (1930) 80. The effect of
a labor injunction in alienating public support has often been pointed out. See, e.g.,
Wood Mow. & Reap. Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 196, 196 N. Y. Supp. 95, 102
(Sup. Ct, 1921).
6. In hardly any of the few cases in the Federal courts between 1901 and 1923
where some form of appeal from a temporary injunction was sought was an appellate
decision rendered in less than three months after the issuance of the temporary injunction.
None was rendered in less than one month. FPANKFURIr= & Gnmiau, Tun IAa INc-
jUNcroN (1930) Appendix II. Yet during the same period the great majority of
disputes were ended in less than one month, and practically none lasted as long as three
months. See (1927) 24 MONTHLY Lsoa Rav. 101 (June); (1928) 26 MommrLy LA=
Rnv. 113 (Jan.). The average duration of strikes is no longer today. (1933) 46
MONTHLY LA oR Rnv. 178 (average duration of strikes in Sept, 1937, was 22 calendar
days).
7. " . . . in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the court shall,
upon the request of any party to the proceedings . . ., forthwith certify as in ordinary
cases the record of the case to the circuit court of appeals for its review. Upon the
filing of such record . . ., the appeal shall be heard and the temporary injunctive
order affirmed, modified, or set aside with the greatest possible expedition, giving the
proceedings precedence over all other matters except older matters of the same char-
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a judge grants an injunction without conforming to the statutory require-
ment on the ground that the case does not involve or grow out of a "labor
dispute," the defendant is confronted with a serious doctrinal difficulty in
obtaining a "speedy appeal," because the statute only provides for this method
of review in a "case involving or growing out of a labor dispute."' More-
over, even where courts are properly willing to hurdle this logical obstacle,'
"speedy appeals" may prove to be inadequate remedies.10 Appellate tribunals
are not always in session, and even when they are, it is doubtful whether
they can and will act with sufficient expedition to meet labor's needs. In
these contingencies, a swift review must be obtained by other means.
Since Norris-La Guardia type acts are framed in terms of jurisdiction,1 1
some form of collateral attack would seem to afford the most effective method
of reviewing such improperly-issued injunctions. Ordinarily, in order to
give a court jurisdiction of the subject matter,12 the allegations of the com-
plaint must disclose a controversy within the jurisdiction conferred by the
acter." 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U.S. C. § 110 (1934). The wording of the tate
statutes is similar. See, e.g., N. Y. C. P. A. § 876-a, 9.
8. See Boise Grocery Co. v. Stevenson, 73 P. (2d) 947, 948 (Idaho, 1937); New
Negro Alliance v. Harry Kaufman, Inc., 78 F. (2d) 415, 416 (App. D. C., 1935) semble.
9. In Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, 275 N. W. 300 (Minn. 1937) the
trial and appellate courts apparently overlooked the doctrinal necessity that a "labor
dispute" exist in order to grant a "speedy appeal" and stated that the defendant should
have made use of the "speedy appeal" procedure
10. It is not yet possible to ascertain, with any accuracy, how rapidly an appellate
decision may be had under the "speedy appeal" provisions. Curbstone opinions of labor
lawyers indicate a general feeling that the process should take from one to two months.
Yet the majority of labor disputes are ended in less than a month. See note 6, supra.
11. See, e.g., 47 STAT. 70-1 (1932), 29 U.S. C. §§ 104, 107 (1934).
12. The term "jurisdiction over the subject matter" is here used, in its broadest
sense, to include the constitutional and statutory power of a court to issue the particular
kind of decree rendered. The distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter
and jurisdiction to render the particular decree is but rarely made, for the two are
closely akin. See In re Wooley's Estate, 96 Vt. 60, 63, 117 At. 370 (1922); 1 Fn=WAN;,
JuDomENns (5th ed. 1925) 734. Apparently the American Law Institute does not make
the distinction. RESTATEuENT, CoNFLIcr op LAws (1934) § 429b. A lack of such
jurisdiction renders a judgment subject to collateral attack. In re Bonner, 151 U. S.
242 (1894); People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923); see Frmss, ExRA-
OitmNARY LEGAL REmmms (1926) 37.
It has been suggested that the statutes simply refer to "equity-jurisdiction," which
generally does not give rise to collateral attack. See (1938) 51 HAnv. L. REv, Y47,
But it is significant that, in introducing the bill Senator Norris stated that "the bill
takes away from all Federal courts the power to issue such [labor] injunctions." SEn.
REp. No. 1060 part 2, 71st Cong., Zd Sess. (1930) 15. Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210
U. S. 230, 235 (1908). Moreover, the industrial struggle which led to the enactment
of the statutes suggests that something more was intended than a mere instruction to
the courts that they should not issue such injunctions, and that, if they did so they
would be reversed upon appeal.
1138 [Vol. 47: 1136
ATTACK UPON LABOR INJUNCTIONS
constitution and statutes.13 The typical anti-injunction act expressly deprives
the court of jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction in any case "involv-
ing or growing out of a labor dispute," unless certain procedural and sub-
stantive requirements have been complied with.14 Thus, if the allegations
dcearly indicate a "labor dispute," a persuasive argument might be made that
an enjoining court which does not conform to those requirements loses juris-
diction over the subject matter even though it possesses jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants through their appearance in the injunction pro-
ceedings. The injunctive order would be rendered void and might be at-
tacked collaterally.' 5
While this interpretation seems dearly authorized by the statutes 0 the
contention may still be made that since the trial court, in entertaining the bill
for an injunction, has undoubted jurisdiction to determine whether or not a
"labor dispute" exists, exercise of that jurisdiction may be reviewed only
by direct appeal.'7 Some authority for this position may be deduced from
the Baldwin cases, which held that a party who has appeared and participated
in a proceeding cannot later attack the judgment collaterally on the ground
that it was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over his person18 So
13. See Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U. S. 470, 475 (1930) ; 1 F=. -
MAN, JuD mEN's (5th ed., 1925) §§ 336-33&
14. Substantively, the courts lack jurisdiction to restrain joining labor unions,
aiding strikers, patrolling or otherwise publicizing the facts involved in the dispute,
paying strike benefits, etc. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 104 (1934). Procedurally,
they are deprived of jurisdiction to enjoin any act at all unless they have made findings
of fact that (a) unlawful acts will be committed, (b) irreparable damage to com-
plainant's property will follow, (c) greater injury will be done to complainant by denial
than to defendants by the grant of the requested relief, (d) complainant has no adequate
remedy at law, (e) that the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. 47 STAT. 71 (1932),
29 U. S. C. § 107 (1934). State statutes are similar. See, e.g., N. Y. C. P. A. 876-a,1.
15. People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff, 299 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Sup. Ct., 1937), (1938)
51 HAv., L. REv. 747, (1938) 86 U. or PA. L. REv. 676. The likelihood of such an
occurrence is increased by the common practice of adopting wholesale the allegations of
petitions in other labor cases. The stereotyped language of these highly-exaggerated
allegations accords well with the definition of a "labor dispute." See FRANrfrun= &
GREENE, THE LABOR INJuNcrtON (1930) pp. 60-66.
16. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person . . . from doing . . . any of the following
acts: . . ." 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S.C. § 104 (1934). "No court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute . . . except after findings of fact by the
court to the effect . . ." 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S. C. § 107 (1934).
. 17. See Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, 275 N. NV. 300, 301, 304 (1937),
(1938) 38 CoL. I REv. 499, (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 747, (1938) 22 Mzr. L REv.
432, (1938) 86 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 676.
1& Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931); American
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932).
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questionable, however, is the applicability of this doctrine to jurisdiction
over the subject matter that the American Law Institute has expressly re-
served opinion.' 9 Admittedly, the parties can confer personal jurisdiction
upon the tribunal by waiver or even by the mere act of contesting the issue
of jurisdiction.20 Jurisdiction over the subject-matter, however, cannot be
waived 2' but must stem from constitutional or statutory provisions.22 More-
over, basic to the Baldwin doctrine is the assumption that at some time a
procedure for effectually reviewing the trial court's judgment actually ex-
isted.23 In labor injunction cases that assumption is invalid, for the impossi-
bility of preserving the status quo renders ordinary appellate procedure of
slight practical use. Therefore, it could be argued that application of the
Baldwin doctrine to cases involving the construction of anti-injunction statutes
would unduly extend its scope.24
Several procedural devices of varying usefulness are available to translate
this doctrine of collateral attack into an effective check upon improperly-
issued labor injunctions. In one category may be placed writs of habeas
corpus and appeals from contempt proceedings, both of which involve risking
the consequences of a violation of the injunction order; in another, writs of
prohibition and counter-injunctions, the primary purpose of which is to enjoin
enforcement of the injunction.
The writ of habeas corpus has often been utilized to afford relief from a
contempt commitment which is void because the court order was issued
without jurisdiction.25  Comparatively new in labor cases,20 this device has
19. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §451 caveat. Accord: Vallely v.
Northern Fire Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348 (1920). But cf. AnNow & JAMES, CASES ON
TRIALs, JUDGMENTS AND APEALS (1936) 131-6. However, even if the Baldwan doctrine
is admitted to be generally applicable to jurisdiction over the subject matter, it would
not seem to apply to a situation where the issue of jurisdiction is not "judicably in-
quirable," i.e., where there is no doubt that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter. See Baldwin v. Anderson, 50 Idaho 606, 616, 299 Pac. 341, 344 (1931). In
such cases collateral attack may be permitted even though the parties appeared and
participated in the proceedings.
20. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931); John
Simmons Co. v. Sloan, 104 N. J. Law 612, 142 Atl. 15 (1928).
21. Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); North-
western Fuel Co. v. Live Stock State Bank, 182 Minn. 276, 234 N. W. 304 (1931);
see Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N. H. 341, 342, 168 Atl. 895,
896 (1933). But cf., In re De Lue, 295 Fed. 130 (C. C.A. lst, 1924); In re N. Y.
Tunnel Co., 166 Fed. 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908).
22. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936),
cert. denied, 298 U. S. 675 (1936); see Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm., 281 U. S.
470, 475 (1930).
23. See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 164-5 (1932).
24. Even if the Baldwin doctrine should be deemed generally applicable to the
subject matter, nevertheless there are many cogent reasons for not considering it to
apply in this type of labor case. See infra p. 1142, et seq.
25. Ex porte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885); In re Depue, 185 N. Y, 60, 77 N. E.
798 (1906); See (1934) 12 N. C. L. Rav. 258.
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the advantage of broadening the defendant's field of search for a favorably
disposed judge, since the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus is practically
universal.2 7 Furthermore, delay is minimized and dependence upon appellate
court sessions is eliminated. On the other hand, an appeal from the contempt
citation, a method of collateral attack attempted in a recent widely discussed
case,m8 lacks the practical advantages of the remedy of habeas corpus. Besides
not permitting the selection of favorable judicial personnel, it is no less time-
consuming than a direct appeal from the injunctive order itself, and at the
same time is subject to all the disadvantages of a collateral attackP
A writ of prohibition is particularly adapted to those situations where the
defendants deem it inexpedient to risk contempt proceedings and where the
trial court refuses to permit a "speedy appeal" because it has already deter-
mined that the case did not "involve or grow out of a labor dispute."510
Although this remedy is ordinarily regarded as "direct" rather than "col-
lateral," the usual requirement that it be based upon the trial court's want or
excess of jurisdiction places it, for this purpose, in the category of collateral
attack.A2 While swifter than an ordinary appeal, a writ of prohibition is
dependent upon the sessions of an appellate tribunal and is slower than a
26. People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff, 299 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Sup. Ct., 1937); see
Giltner v. Becker, 133 Kan. 170, 174, 298 Pac. 780, 782 (1931) (Clayton Act type of
state statute).
27. In many jurisdictions, the writ may be issued by any judge of either the lower or
appellate courts without requiring the full court to be sitting. See, e.g., 43 STAT. 940
(1925), 28 U.S. C. § 452 (1934). In New York any justice of the Supreme Court
has statewide jurisdiction to issue the writ. N. Y. C. P. A. J 1232.
2X Reid v. Independent Union of All Vorkers, 275 N. NV. 300 (Minn. 1937). Notes
on this case are listed in note 17, supra.
29. State ex reL Tuthill v. Giddings, 98 Minn. 102, 107 N. NV. 1043 (1905); Reid
v. Independent Union of All Vorkers, 275 N. W. 300 (Minn. 1937); see FrruEnr
& Gzmm, Tin Lma INjuNcrtoN (1930) 56. But the automatic application of the
rules of "collateral attach' to criminal contempt proceedings for violation of a "labor
injunction" may seriously be qtestioned. Although such actions have frequently been
described as "independent" proceedings [see Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418, 445 (1911)] so that vacation of the injunction will not terminate the
court's power to punish for contumacy, they are not necessarily "collateral" proceed-
ings. Indeed the idea of "collateral attack" appears incongruous when it is remembered
that the contempt proceeding really arises from the injunction, is but a means of enforc-
ing the injunctive order, is almost invariably begun not by a complaint, but by an
affidavit, involves the same controversy instituted in the injunction proceedings, and is,
for all practical purposes, between the same parties. See SwAYzEE, CoN.-T.me iZ LAo
INjucrroK CAsES (1935) 25 n. 3.
30. Cf. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936),
cert. dexied, 298 U. S. 675 (1936); Olroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 Pac. 580
(1925); see Fmxs, Exm'owrxARY LEGAL RE mrEs (1926) § 310.
31. State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n v. Tracy, 237 Mo. 109, 140 S. W. 883
(1911) ; Bullard v. Thorpe, 66 Vt. 599, 30 Atl. 36 (1894) ; see 2 BAILEY, JUIsDIcTION
(1899) § 446. Some courts will allow the writ merely if there is no adequate remedy
by appeal. State v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).
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writ of habeas corpus.32 A final technique, as yet untried in labor cases, is
a suit in a second court to enjoin the employer from enforcing his injunction
on the ground that it would be unconscionable to give effect to a void judg-
ment.33 Insofar as a violation of the first injunction is punishable as a criminal
contempt, proceedings under it cannot be prevented for that would amount
to enjoining the first court itself.34 However, if the violation is to be punished
only at the instance of the employer as a civil contempt, there appears to
be little reason for not enjoining enforcement of the first injunction.11
Discussion thus far has been based upon the assumption that instead of
differentiating among various categories of cases, the concept of collateral
attack must be treated with equal rigidity in labor controversies. But inas-
much as collateral attack is largely a judge-made doctrine and therefore
supposedly flexible, that hypothesis warrants dose examination. If the rule
performs no useful functions in connection with the type of labor case under
consideration, it should either be modified or entirely abandoned. Ccssantc
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. Although the doctrine is still of value in pro-
tecting titles,30 much more important today is its function as a concomitant
of an orderly system of administering justice.37 Far from being an immutable
constitutional canon, restriction upon collateral attack, as applied to judgments
of courts in the same judicial system, is mainly the result of a pragmatic
adaptation to the needs of judicial administration. A state could, conceivably,
provide no appellate machinery but instead permit great freedom of collateral
attack. On the other hand, there would be no constitutional objection to
prohibition of collateral attack in all cases except those in which the defendant
was given no notice and opportunity to defend, thereby forcing litigants to
32. In some jurisdictions the writ of prohibition may prove to be swifter than a
"speedy appeal" because of a difference in the rules regarding notice of appeal, printing
and filing of records and briefs, etc.
33. Cf. Georgia Power Co. v. T.V.A., 17 F. Supp. 769 (D. Ga., 1937), aff'd sub.
non. In re Georgia Power Co., 89 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ; Mann v. Flowers,
26 Minn. 479, 5 N. W. 365 (1880) ; Schneider v. Leizmnan, 57 Hun 561, 11 N.Y. Supp.
434 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
34. Johnston Min. Co. v. Morse, 44 Misc. 504, 90 N. Y. Supp. 107 (Sup. Q.,
1904) ; see Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. U. S. 123, 163 (1908).
35. Injunctions have been used for the somewhat similar purpose of preventing the
enforcement of other than injunctive decrees. Mann v. Flowers, 26 Minn. 479, 5
N. W. 365 (1880); Erie R. R. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637 (1871). Similarly, injunctions
against proceedings in other courts under the guise of "protecting the jurisdiction" of
the enjoining court are familiar. Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U. S. 214 (1918);
Georgia Power Co. v. T.V.A., 17 F. Supp. 769 (D. Ga., 1936), aff'd sub, nom. In re
Georgia Power Co., 89 F. (2d) 218 (C. C.A. 5th, 1937), (1937) 4 U. oF Cur. L. Rv.
496; New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Pcrdiue, 97 Ind. App. 517, 187 N.E. 349 (1933).
36. See VANFLE.T, COLLATERAL ATrAcK (1892) 3.
37. See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 305. For a graphic comparison of
collateral attack and regular appellate machinery, see ARNOLD AND JAMES, op. cit, supra
note 19, at 131-36.
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rely exclusively upon appellate procedures.38 Naturally, when provision is
made for effective appellate machinery, it is to be expected that restrictions
will be placed upon the scope of collateral attack. In ordinary cases it is in
the interest of efficient and orderly judicial administration to proscribe col-
lateral attack whenever the defendant had a real opportunity to contest issues
and to get an effective review by appeal 3 To accomplish this result, it might
even be wise to ignore the doctrinal distinctions between jurisdiction over
the person and over the subject-matter, and to apply the rule of the Baldan
cases to both.40 Possibly, exceptions should be made in cases where no court
within the sovereignty is granted jurisdiction over the particular subject-
matter,41 or where, after affirmance on appeal in criminal cases, a collateral
attack is permitted because of the dramatic nature of the defendant's plight.
42
At all events, except where there would be a denial of due process because
the defendant had .no notice or opportunity to defend, the allowable area of
collateral attack is entirely a matter of local policy to be determined by the
legislature and the courts. Some variation between types of cases is there-
fore dearly proper.
When a collateral attack is made upon a judgment of a court within the
same judicial system, after a decision in the matter by the highest state court,
it seems clear that the policy in favor of definitiveness of adjudication should
generally control and collateral attack should be permitted only in excep-
tional circumstances. 43 But when the attack is made before a decision by
38. Cf. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15 (1890); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244
U. S. 25 (1917); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's As'n, 233 U. S. 522 (1931);
American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932).
39. See ARNow Am J.mus, op. cit. supra note 19, at 131-36; 1 FnmumAuz, JuDc-
gmErs (5th ed. 1925) § 305; Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction, (1931)
31 CoT.. L Rzv. 238, 263. Such is the purpose of the familiar rule that domestic judg-
ments of courts of general jurisdiction can be attacked collaterally only when the want
of jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record, and that extrinsic evidence may not
be produced to impeach the record. Coit v. Haven, 30 Conn. 190 (1861).
40. The practical reasons for putting an end to litigation are as compelling in one
case as in the other. See Comment (1936) 45 YAtu L. . 1100; (1936) 46 YAM I. J.
159. A few cases tacitly apply the doctrine of res adjudicata to jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter. See In re N. Y. Tunnel Co., 166 Fed. 283 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903) ; In re De Lue,
295 Fed. 130 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
41. Cf. People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923) ; 1 Fnmu.t, Juruz.uxts
(5th ed. 1925) 759.
42. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937), (1937) 35 Mica. L. REv. 1373. The
Supreme Court also refused to grant Thomas J. Mooney's petition for an original writ
of habeas corpus until he had first attempted to secure a similar writ from a state court.
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
43. Cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522, (1931); Coit
v. Haven, 30 Conn. 190 (1861). However, some commentators have instead focused
attention upon the issue of the conclusiveness of adjudications of one court in the courts
of another sovereign. See Medina, Conclusi'cness of Rulings on Jurisdidction, (1931) 31
CoL. L. REv. 238; Comment (1936) 45 Ymx L. J. 1100.
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machinery. If that machinery is adequate, collateral attack should be denied.But when reversal on appeal cannot undo the effects of a temporary usurpa-tion of jurisdiction, there is no reason why collateral attack should not beregarded as an appropriate way of preventing courts from hoisting themselvesby their own bootstraps. In these cases the consequences of a collateralattack are hardly calculated to disrupt judicial administration, for if thereis any real doubt as to the propriety of the second court's action, the ultimatedecision will be rendered by the appellate court much as if the ordinaryappellate procedure had been used. A further safeguard would be found inthe self-restraint of the second coordinate court, which would hardly enter-tain such a collateral attack unless it dearly appeared that the first court hadacted arbitrarily, and that an appeal would be futile. Obviously, the occasionfor this brand of collateral attack is particularly opportune in labor injunc-tion cases where an appeal from the injunctive order is inadequate as aremedy, for the strike would be smothered beyond hope of revival, pendingappeal." True, the employer will, in large measure, lose the benefits of theinjunction. But since the situation under consideration is one where theinjunction dearly contravenes the anti-injunction act and should never havebeen issued, the balance of equity and convenience is undoubtedly with thedefendant. Since anti-injunction legislation is definitely committed to thepolicy of favoring defendant unions in case of doubt, 45 and since the injunc-tive remedy itself is an extraordinary one to be used only sparingly,40 therisk of a possible error by the second court might well be borne by theemployer.The close connection between the doctrine of collateral attack and theavailability of effective appellate machinery is further evidenced by thegreater scope permitted to such attacks in the courts of one state againstjudgments rendered by courts of another state.47 The lack of a commonappellate superior (except on federal questions) to coordinate collateralattack in one state with appeals in another state militates in favor of allowingthis irregular method of review. Otherwise a defendant would be subjectedto the hardship of answering charges brought against him in the courts ofanother sovereign and the territorial independence of the states would beundermined. The prime consideration is not so much the power over thedefendant of the particular court in the foreign state, but rather with thepower of the foreign state itself.
44. See p. 1137, supra.45. See, e.g., Witte, The Federal Anti-Injiinction Act, (1932) 16 MINN. L, REV.638, 658; Comment (1933) 21 GMG. L. J. 344, 351.46. The employer always retains his remedy at law for damages.47. Compare Coit v. Haven, 30 Conn. 190 (1861) with Thompson v. Whitman, 18Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873).
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With respect to the federal courts, the problem is much the same as in
the state judicial systems. When a collateral attack by one federal court
upon the judgment of another federal court is involved, the issue is simply
one of providing an efficient machinery for review. If the normal processes
of appeal afford adequate relief, collateral attack is unnecessary; if not, col-
lateral attack is desirable and should be allowed. Moreover, since there can
be no fear of giving extraterritorial effect to federal decrees, collateral attack
in state courts upon the judgments of the federal tribunals should be allowed
but sparingly. Indeed, if "federal jurisdiction" were subject to collateral
attack by state courts, every federal court judgment could be attacked col-
laterally and definitive adjudication by federal tribunals would be virtually
impossible. Hence the Supreme Court has ruled that diversity of citizenship
and the amount in controversy can only be examined by ordinary appellate
processes, since these are quite sufficient to remedy any error.' B Labor in-
junction cases obviously present totally different considerations.
On the whole, the devices presently available to remedy injunctions issued
in flagrant disregard of Norris-La Guardia type statutes are merely of
random utility. But a few amendments to anti-injunction legislation could
eliminate much of the present confusion. A mild reform would be achieved
by specifically providing for a "speedy appeal" whenever a party claims that
the case "involves or grows out of a labor dispute." More fundamental would
be an amendment providing that in any controversy where such a claim is
made and an injunction requested, trial is to be by a multiple-judge court
similar to those already required to try constitutional,40 rate, and anti-trust 5'
cases. Certainly such special treatment is merited by the large numbers
affected by labor injunctions and the urgency of the issues involved. Although
no legislation can guarantee labor complete insulation from judicial abuse, such
a system would at least avoid the crushing consequences of a single judge's
imjustified assumption of jurisdiction. 2
48. Dosell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327 (1894); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. McCabe,
213 U. S. 207 (1909).
49. 50 STAT. 752, 28 U. S. C. A. § 380a (1937) (federal statutes); 37 STAT. 1013
(1913) as amended 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 38D (1934) (state statutes).
50. 37 STAT. 1013 (1913), as amended 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 38) (1934)
as modified by 48 STAT. 775, 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1934).
51. 36 STAT. 854 (1910), 15 U. S. C. § 28 (1934).
52. Pending such legislation, much of the sting could be withdrawn from these im-
properly-issued temporary labor injunctions by extending the use of the stay of execution
pending appeal. Usually obtainable from any appellate judge, this device is designed to
preserve the status quo pending final adjudication. Since a temporary injunction is sup-
posed to perform a similar function, issuance of a stay would flatly contradict the holding
that the temporary injunction was necessary. But when a hostile trial judge has disre-
garded the express legislative mandate, this contradiction by an appellate judge finds
ready justification.
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